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Abstract
The debate over pnvatizing and water markets has moved back and forth for decades
between the “I”and the “We”perspectives. Rather than either/or, a balanced “I&We’*view of water
institutions is needed. West is meeting east in water law. Public interest needs must be satisfied
in appropriate decision forums, but marketing may prove a social improvement when used as a
supplement. Balancing an “I&We” institution involves establishing an acceptable or tolerable level
of interference through judicious mixing of state, common and private property regimes. Third-
party effects are eliminated as mutual gain arises in a variety of decision forums.
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At least since the 1950s and perhaps much
earlier in this centuty (Lasky), there has been in the
literature a debate over which is the most sociaIIy
appropriate water allocation institution. Those who
would apply market theory emphasize increasing
water value and opportunist y for mutual gain
(Trelease 1965; Anderson 1983a,b). Prior
appropriation water law is often seen to represent
the best way to achieve these goals. Riparian
common law facilitates increasing the value of
water through judicial interpretation of
reasonableness, but does not provide well for mutual
gain since transfers may be compensated onIy by
judicial decision (Rose; Sax). Public interest theory
found quite dominant in both riparian and
administrative law systems emphasizes equitable
distribution among fitture as well as current users
not well represented by market processes (Lasky;
Ciriacy-Wantrup 1956, 1967; Johnson 1971; Brown
and Ingram, Swaney),
At core, this debate is ultimately centered
on the appropriate balance of the “I” (the self-
interest, the private interest) and the “We” (the
community-interest, the public interest).] At the
extremes of this debate, the “I” position calls for
compIete individual volition through privatizing and
marketing (Anderson 1983a,b; Howe et al. 1986;
Milliman). At the other extreme, the “We” position
calls for controls over individuals, generally through
government administrative systems (e.g., Maloney
et al, 1972; Utton). In the “We” view, water is far
too important to be evaluated exclusively in terms
of economic welfare (Brown and Ingram, p. 38).
Water is a need and plays a central role in “the
fabric of the very concept of community” (Utton, p,
992).
We indicate the main themes underlying
and in the water marketing literature with the intent
of helping to direct future research and discussion
about privatizing and marketing southeastern water.
We draw on Saarinen and Lynne (1993a). Most
writers tend to take either an “I” or a” We” position.
We prefer the analytical position in socioeconomic
(Etzioni) that the “I” does not exist without a “We,”
but then neither can the “We” exist without many
viable “Is”: we propose that all future water
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allocation research and discussion be framed on an
“I&We” perspective.z The discussion draws on the
western U.S. experience. To set the stage, we
briefly return to 18th century America and England,
at about the time of Adarn Smith.
Historical Perspective On the “I” and “We”
Views
Modern discussion about alternative ways
for organizing a society can easily be traced at least
back to the 1700’s (see Etzioni, esp. pp 6-8). The
radical individualism (the “I” view) popularized by
the Whigs developed “in opposition to an
authoritarian monarchy and a tightly woven society
that imposed its moral code via the established
religion (Gutridge cited by Etzioni, p. 6. See also
Chalk),” in response to severe controls of
individuals far beyond mere influence. Extreme
versions of this “I” view are apparent in the call for
privatizing and open water marketing by
contemporary economic whigs including Howe,
(Delworth) Gardner and, especially, Anderson
(1983a), Howe et al, (1986, p. 444) temper their
arguments somewhat, even though arguing that
markets best meet all six of their criteria.3
Expression of the “We” view can be traced
back at least to the Tories in the 1700’s and
probably relates to medieval social institutions.
Individual rights are subservient to the tribe,
motherland. church and society (Etzioni, p. 7). The
“We” view suggests organizing a society around one
set of ultimate values and a strong state to express
and reinforce these values (Etzioni, p, 7).
Significantly, contempomy economic Tories
opposed to privatizing and marketing water are
difficult to find: the view is simply inconsistent with
the philosophy built into the mainstream (largely
neoclassical) paradigm. It is easy to find Tories
with other discipline backgrounds, e.g., Brown and
Ingram; Mumme and Ingram; Maloney 1970.
Back to the debate: it rests on rather basic
differences in social philosophy. The Tory view
presupposes that people are born knaves, and just
naturally prey on each othec thus the need for
collective control, In contrast, the Whig view
presupposes that people are born nobles who will
ultimately interact in harmonious ways arising from
a spontaneous order with no need for collective
control: thus individuals need to be free to choose.
We now present in turn the “I” and the
“We”perspectives. A reviewer of an earlier draft of
this paper suggested we were creating strawpeople4,
which we could then easily knock down with our
“I&We” paradigm. Our motivation is different.
Rather, we believe writers should make underlying
beliefs and values (i.e., philosophies) explicit, and
that we should debate especially the value issues
head on rather than indirectly through ideological
assertions. This is a way to insure progress in the
debate.
A Liberal Social Order, “I,” and Water
What values, beliefs and philosophies
underlie the pro-market rhetoric? We draw on
Hayek (1967, Chp. 20, in Nishiyama and Leube)
and Anderson (1983b). We review the 12 main
elements of the “I” view.
First, the “I” view represents the belief that
it is impossible to know ex ante how to order social
relations (i.e., it is impossible to know the social
welfare function), so we cannot intentionally design
water institutions to elicit specific behaviors.
Rather, the evolution toward markets is spontaneous
and natural, as long as we remove “impediments”
(Gardner 1987),5
Second, while rules defining what
individuals are to do are impossible to formulate,
the community is to define what individuals cannot
do in mutually agreed coercion. These “thou shalt
not” rules evolve in a spontaneous moral order
(Buchanan) in the common law, not from
legislation, Government functions best under the
common law,
Third, the “I” view puts great importance
on access to water by entrepreneurs with new ideas
through entry/exit (Anderson 1985, p. 897). This
access idea is reflected in riparian law, illustrating
that the influence of this view is far wider than just
in economics. In the late 1700’s and early 1800’s,
U.S, courts were prime movers in insuring
economic development by reallocating water awayJ. Agr. and Applied Econ,, JI{ly, 1993 71
from the landed gentry to the innovative industrialist
(Tyler v. Wilkinson (1827) and Webb v. Portland
Manufacturing Co. (1838), see Horwitz; Rose),
This adaptability in the search for mutual gains may
be the most important criterion for choosing one
institution over another (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1967).6
Yet, the “I” view also recognizes that too
much access can be counter productive. Butler (fn.
13, p. 102) argues that a prime reason for replacing
riparianism with prior appropriation in the western
U.S. was to limit access in order to insure viable
individual economic units, Senior appropriators
represent that set: ironically, while most writers
with the “I” philosophy tout the prior appropriation
system with its perpetual rights, a main feature of
successful common property arrangements is also a
set of rules for excluding and controlling the
number of users of the resource (see Ostrom;
Bromley 1992). The “We” also needs viable “1’s.”
Fourth, under the “I” view property rights
would seemingly be defined in the productive
capacity of the aquifers, lakes and rivers to produce
water, analogous to property in the productive
capacity of land to produce crops. Economists
know the John Locke story about the necessity of
fencing the commons. Fifth, capacity rights insure
geohydrologic independence (no interference)
among water users, In fact, the “thou shalt not
rules” insure individuals are independent, as in the
macroeconomic textbook assumption, i.e., no
interdependence, no jointness and thus no
interference. With no interference, we get the sixth
feature of mutual gains, i.e., economic efficiency,
during all transactions, and seventh, that individuals
have the freedom to seek individual goals
(maximizing, or satisficing, whatever it is they do).
Volition and mutual gain insures opportunity costs
are paid. Eighth, conflict vanishes because
everyone gains.
Ninth, each individual has a moral
obligation to accept the outcome of what the water
market brings. When it is no longer profitable to
irrigate corn, sell your water permit. Yet, tenth,
even in the “I” view, when the economy treats you
really badly, some minimal support (welfare) will be
provided (Hayek, in Nishiyama and Leuhe, p. 378).
Eleventh, the “I” view presumes that the
market transmits alI relevant value information
through prices back to the resource users, Take the
extreme, textbook view for the moment. Assume
buyers of Florida strawberries in Atlanta in January
are conservationists and would like to see Florida
farmers conserve water. In the extreme “I” view,
these consumers could express their conservation
values at the Atlanta supermarket (with appropriate
product labeling, maybe this is possible) to get
Florida farmers to use drip irrigation. These
conservationists presumably would pay a premium
price for drip-irrigated strawberries. Another way
to state this “I” beliefi there are no other legitimate
decision forums for transmitting values about use of
conserving technologies. An administrative rule-
making process in a Florida water district as
decision forum, attended by the Atlanta
conservationists representative from a national
conservation group, which results in tilp-irrigation,
or a soil-conservation drip-irrigation cost sharing
program arrived at in the legislative decision forum,
and influenced by the Atlanta conservationists
congressional representative, would simply not be
legitimate ways to express conservation values.
Private and public vatues can be expressed only in
the market forum (although Buchanan, who is in the
“I” camp, recognizes value expression in other
forums).
The twelfth is that of the assumed ethical
(i.e., no knaves) and knowledgeable population.
With such individuals, there is no need for an
agency to specify the best rate and timing of
pumping to reduce salt water intrusion in a coastal
aquifer. In fact, with every ethical “I” having all
relevant knowledge, the only issue is if s/he is
willing to pay for sustainability. [f not, others may
be willing. These others will enter the water
market, buy the water right and pump the source at
the aquifer sustaining rate,
We could end the paper here. It is easier
to take this philosophical stance and then work
toward privatizing and water marketing without all
the messiness of ideas like public interest, public
values, and the “We.” Maybe that is why so much
of the economic literature stops here without
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seems it is about these very beliefs and values, that
we should debate. Also, we favor economic
analysis addressing actual life experience.
A Community Presence, “We” and Water
One useful way of understanding what
composes the “We” view is to step through the
looking glass and to look back at the “I.” The
mirror image suggests institutions can be
intentionally designed under the assumption that the
complexity of social relations and the social welfare
function can be understood ex ante, state property is
preferred to individual property, not only “thou shalt
not” but “thou shatt” rules are needed, mutual gain
is the exception rather than the rule, social order can
be attained only with control, adequate information
is virtually never transmitted through the market
place (so there is a strong need for other decision
forums in addition to marketing, see Nunn and
Ingram), and educational processes are not adequate
to the task of ensuring that all individuals will be
knowledgeable (and noble) enough. The “We”
view is concerned with the public interest, the
shared values, the public goods, and is especially
concerned with long term (intergenerational)
distribution issues which are beyond the “I’’/discount
rate based decision-making.
Most importantly, the “We” view
recognizes the general impossibility y of becoming
independent, one from the other. We are inherently
interdependent and thus there is usually interference,
Giving even only a modicum of credibility to this
view implies the need to shift the focus to finding
an acceptable or tolerable level of interference. As
Bromley (1989, p.207) notes, collective choice
involves mediating interference. We call it
“tolerable interference” here and see its mediation
and definition as the necessary precursor to starting
a water market.
Tendencies In Water Law Favor An “I&We”
Perspective
There is already a “We” embedded in water
law (see, e.g., Lynne and Burkhardt, esp, pp. 1061-
65). Trelease (1961, p. 1152) argues that “The law
belongs to the people; it represents the value
judgments of the majority as to desirable courses of
conduct that may be taken.” Ciriacy-Wantrup
(1967, p. 398) notes that “Most of the content of
water law relates to establishing a normative
framework for the economic behavior of individuals
and groups with respect to one of their most
pressing economic wants.” Often this water law
reflects the judgment that any threat to water is a
threat to the communal enterprise (Brajer and
Martin, p. 38), which includes far more than the
economy. Water is perceived as “being too
important to be evaluated exclusively in terms of
economic welfare (Brown and Ingram cited in
Brajer and Martin, p. 38).” Courts often view water
this way, where beneficial use means far more (or
far less) than profitable use.
Tadock (1991) has pointed out that water
marketing based in prior appropriation in the west
has been hard on public vaJues. Such values cannot
be completely transferred through market prices
(Utton, p. 991), and are often better transferred
through other decision forums (Utton; Nunn and
Ingram). Representing the public vaJues has
become a big challenge in the west.
Most western states have some type of
decision forum reflecting the “We”embedded in law
underlying or supplementing the market (see Colby
et al. 1989). In New Mexico, the state engineer
(Johnsonet d., P. 284) reviews all proposed
transfers for impacts on public values. Recently in
Montana, three levels of public interest criteria were
added to all local transfers (Thorson 1989, p. 482).
The California Supreme Court decision in Nafionaf
Audubon Society v. Superior Court (Mono Lake) set
the stage for an important integration of the public
trust doctrine and prior appropriation throughout the
west. The doctrine was expanded beyond traditional
navigation, commerce and fishing concerns to
include ecological preservation, open space
maintenance and scenic and wildlife protection
(Thorson 1986, p. 75). The public trust doctrine has
been used to express public values in several other
western states as well, including Idaho, New
Mexico and North Dakota (Thorson 1986, pp. 73-
74),
In contrast, contemporary eastern riparian
law (also in contrast to its flavor in the late 1700s,
early 1800s) gives overwhelming attention to the
public interest. Abrams has suggested this spells
doom for the riparian doctrine: we believe it alsoJ. Agr. aud Applied Econ., July, 1993 73
could mean doom for the Florida administrative
system unless ways are found to express the private
interest (Saarinen and Lynne 1993b),
We are seeing, then, some meeting of the
west and the east, of the “I” and the “We.”
Maloney et al. (1972, 1979) argue west has already
met east in their Model Water Code (on which the
1972 Florida Water Resources Act is based), The
public trust doctrine is apparent in the Code, as it
puts the highest priority on the public interest (e.g.,
hydrologic integrity and intergenerationat fairness,
protection of water related ecosystems, domestic
water needs). It creates administrative forums for
mediating interference (e.g., by facilitating
negotiation over maximum pumping rates consistent
with minimum stream flows, long term
sustainability of aquifers, as well as maximum
drawdown of potentiometric surfaces, surface waters
and groundwater tables for neighboring uses).
Unfortunately, once tolerable interference in each of
these cases is mediated, the Code does not specify
any privatizing and marketing to facilitate the
private interest.
The need for a variety of decision forums
for mediating tolerable interference level suggests
the need to evolve state, common and private
property regimes side-by-side (also see the legal
literature, e.g., Rose). The private vs open access
(often mistakenly called common) property idea
should be changed to the state and common and
private property regime(s) idea (Bromley 1992, p.
4). The many successes in state and common
property regime situations (see Bromley, 1992)
should be recognized. Fair is fair, however open
market successes also exist. Markets represent one
of the best ways to bring in the opportunity costs,
but be careful here.
True, we are aware of no empirical
evidence that collective, governmental entities can
adequately account for all private and public
opportunity costs, That may go without saying, but
it sets the stage for saying there is also no empirical
evidence that markets will adequately do so either,
In fact, the evidence in the western U.S. is to the
contrary: many public opportunity costs are not
represented in water mmkets (Saliba et al, 1987,
esp, p. 623). At the same time, many public
opportunity costs are represented by government,
e.g., “thou shatt not overpump the aquifer”
essentially says the opportunity costs are infinite to
do so (see Lynne 1989, p. 423; Lynne and
Burkhardt). We embed opportunity costs in law.
Unfortunately, many opportunity costs are not
reflected in either law or in government decision
forums. In Florida, for example, water districts
have the power to take a permit from one user to
give it to another without compensation, even
though both permits may pass the public interest
test. A mix of property regimes and the associated
mix of decision forums arising therefrom will insure
opportunity costs of all types are represented.
Toward an “I&We” Water Institution in the
Southeastern U.S.
The first general point arising from our
assessment of the literature is that we should avoid
the approach of a butcher by calling for wholesaJe
replacing of all time-honored decision forums with
markets. The western experience suggests this
approach will never work. Rather, we will be more
successful if we use our economic scalpels to
carefully insert institutions for water markets into
the institutional structure that underlies all the
judicial, administrative, legislative decision forums
atready operating. We must recognize that new
rules evolve in the context of old rules and that past
institutional choices may severely limit future ones
(Ostrom, p, 202).
It is clear western water markets are
diverse in the role they play in different settings
(Colby Saliba 1987) which we can expect in the
Southeast. It is equally clear there is no
deterministic, value-flee way to specify the optimal
mix of property regimes, which is the reason we
reviewed the inherent belief and value positions in
the “I” and “We” views. Privatization will make a
lot more sense in areas where the people are highly
individualistic (Bromley 1992, p. 8). Someone must
measure how these positions are viewed by
southeastern water users. The intrinsic features of
water do not dictate the optimal mix of property
regimes. We are faced with choice, which means
we must study values and find ways to facilitate the
expression of values in a variety of decision forums.
Are southeastern citizens/water users ready for this?
Does anyone know, i.e., has anyone systematically74 Lynne and Saarinen: Melding Private and Public Interests in Waler Rigltt.v Markeis
studied southern values and philosophies pertaining
to water allocation processes?
What will happen in the southeast?
Randall believes markets will evolve in a maturing
water economy, characterized by increasing
interdependent y (arising from scarcity) and
increasing opportunity costs. Is the southeastern
U.S. water economy entering middle age, or is it
still but a babe? At least in some areas of
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Texas and Virginia,
certainly we have entered middle age. Opportunity
costs are not zero.
Water marketing in the Southeastern area
may be inevitable. Ground water, for example, has
been defined a commodity for interstate commerce
through Sporhase v, Nebraska (ex rel. Douglas, 458
U.S. 941 1982) (Chan) so it likely is only a matter
of time before water is bought and sold across state
lines (DuMars; Howe 1985). The southemtern
states should look to Colorado and New Mexico
for the most well developed groundwater rights
(see Tarlock 1985, for discussion, esp. p. 1760).
With groundwater already a commodity, it seems
only but a short time for similar recognition for
surface water.
Analysis of Property Regimes
In the spirit of the neurosurgeon rather than
the butcher, we now suggest some specific areas for
consideration. The property right framework is
borrowed from Bromley (1989, pp. 187-191).
Balancing the “I&We” must goon in many different
dimensions.
We draw on actual western experience as
documented for operating water markets in Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho (leasing), Montana
(short term sales and leasing), Nevada, New
Mexico, Utah and Wyoming (negotiated prices)
(Saliba and Bush: Wahl and Osterhoudt), We use
insights from proposals for Hawaii (Anderson
1985), Georgia (Wright and North), Florida (Kiker
and Lynne 1976; Lynne and Burkhardt), Illinois
(Eheart and Lyon) and Virginia (Batie; Johnson;
Shabman and Cox), as well as in other parts of the
world, e.g., the Middle East (Wolf and Dinar).
There has been some market experimentation in
Australia (Dragun and Gleeson; Randall),
Unfortunately, space precludes discussing how each
actual proposal handles each dimension, but see
Saarinen and Lynne (1993a) for more detail.
Balancing the Righl to Posse~s
Throughout the entire U.S., the natural
storage and transport capacity is held in the state
property regime, consistent with civil and common
law based public trust doctrine (see Thorson 1986,
p. 74). Neither common nor private property
regimes usually involve capacity ownership (with
the exception of some western companies owning
distribution facilities, see Colby Saliba and Bush).
We do not see that this deeply held tradition will
change any time soon.
Yet, this tradition of state property for
capacity may simply be due to our ignorance, e.g.,
not knowing how aquifers function (see Brajer and
Martin, p. 264). Recall the move to private
ownership of western rangeland was due in large
part to invention of barbed wire (notice the intrinsic
feature of the common range changed with this new
knowledge). While it may not be as easy to “fence”
an aquifer, it is not impossible to specify its
characteristics and limits, and we continue to learn
more about aquifers, It would be quite easy to
define private and common property in the
productivity of a lake or the transport capability of
a river subject to precipitation uncertainty.
Research should be directed at examining
the possibility y of common property for capacity
ownership by groups of individuals organized in
various types of “appropriator organizations”
(Ostrom’s term): the mutual irrigation companies in
the west are examples. Private property might be
best in specific instances, e.g., aquifer storage and
recovery systems (see, e.g., Dudley and Musgrave
on developing private property in reservoir
capacity).
Balancing the Right 10 Use
Water rights throughout the entire U.S, are
usufruct rights. Initial access to these use rights is
largely first-in-time, first-in-right, either by being
the fwst to acquire riparian land or a water permit
from the state. Numbers of new entrants are
restricted under all systems, either by number ofJ, Agr. and Applied Econ., July, 1993 75
permits (and the withdrawal restrictions) or by
restrictions on the size of land tracts that give rights
to riparian water. As the Southeast moves to water
markets, access (numbers, size of withdrawals) will
still have to be controlled in other decision forums.
The western experience suggests the
importance of separating water use rights from land
ownership, as in Florida (see Colby Saliba et al.
1987, for discussion of both types of systems used
in Arizona). For efficiency purposes, water must be
available to those with expertise and new ideas for
its use, who may or may not be the land owner.
Specificity and flexibility is necessary to
insure opportunity costs are accurately revealed, no
matter what the decision forum, Use rights must be
defined on the basis of both withdrawal and
consumptive use (volume and flow rates), quality of
the water in the right, point of diversion (location),
export restrictions to other watersheds or aquifer
systems, timing, quality and quantity of water
leaving the site of use (e.g., return flows in surface
irrigation), and by type and priority of use. The
idea under all permit systems that water can be used
anywhere as long as it is beneficial use should be
retained, and the riparian idea dropped.
Uncertainty will have to be addressed.
Seemingly, permit quantities with varying
hydrologic certainty might be created which would
command varying prices. Users could hold an
investment portfolio with rights of varying certainty,
which is essentially what happens in western states
having water markets (Wahl and Osterhoudt)
The decision forums used in the Florida
administrative process for expressing public values
should be studied for possible transfer to other
southeastern settings. These forums arise under the
Model Water Code, which is a good place to start
for all eastern states with respect to insuring the
public values are represented (Trelease 1974, esp. p,
213).
for water management or held back to satisfy public
values.
Some base quota should be provided for
every citizen and held in the state property regime.
In fact, there is no need to create a private property
regime for every drop of water.7 Howe et al.
(1986) have suggested the need to market only a
“tradable margin”: as little 10-20 percent of the
water would have to be allocated under the private
regime to give substantial gains in efficiency.
Balancing the Right to Manage
The task is to balance private and public
management which is intricately intertwined with
the property regimes. In fact, a state property
regime may be needed to appropriately manage at
one level, while a common property or private
property regime may be better at another level.
Unfortunately, there is a tendency for pubIic
managers to go too far into the micromanagement
of firms. In Florida, for example, we have limited-
flow shower heads and mandated irrigation system
technologies, and are even told what hours the
irrigation systems can be operated (and how to
design comer fence posts for containing dairy cows
away from rivers). Other southeastern states should
avoid the unfortunate experience of
micromanagement in Florida.
A fascinating area for research is to explore
the large middle ground between state and private
property regimes, within common property regimes.
Could Floridians, for example, improve water
management by extending the current right of local
governments to create water supply authorities
(which hold water permits) to farm groups,
environmental groups, or any other common interest
group? The west addresses water management
through a wide variety of common property entities,
represented in irrigation districts, water districts,
mutual stock companies, mutual irrigation
companies and water user associations (Colby
Saliba et. al. 1987).
Public decision forums need water to Related to the management problem is the
allocate, so some water will have to be held out of information problem. Good management
the private markets. This could be handled by presupposes accurate, relevant and reliable
having some proportion of all permits return to state information. Hydrologic information for supporting
property each year (Kiker and Lynne 1976, p. 60). management systems both at point of use and
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vast quantities of high quality information regarding
how much water of what quality is located where
and when. Agricultural food markets, for example,
rest on a large and stable foundation of market
information provided by state and federal agencies.
A similar foundation would be needed to support
water markets (see Curie; see Ostrom, p. 212, in
describing the success of groundwater markets in
California breed on information from public
agencies). Information costs (and other transactions
costs) will be a factor in deciding on mixes of
property regimes,
Importantly, the hydrologic market
information problem may be reduced somewhat by
the physical plumbing for transfer. Market
information is needed only where transfer is
physically possible such as within a particular
watershed, or within a groundwater basin.
technologies (Angel, p. 1176, Shupe). What is
often overlooked in such commentary is that if
conserved water could be sold, there would likely
be adequate investment. Southeastern water use
rights should allow sale of conserved water.E
Abrams (1989, p. 1395, in citing Horwitz,
p.251 ) notes that in the early years riparian doctrine
(1800s in U.S.) encouraged economic development
by disguising the changes in the complexities of
technicat (riparian) legal doctrine and thereby giving
the illusion of security, when in fact there was little
security. Abrams (1989) suggests riparianism is
cumently heading toward a collapse on this front
because of the tendency to provide security for
established uses, which may not support (p. 1403)
“...the entrepreneurial activity on which the
American economic system depends.” This is
largely the matter of access in different clothing.
Balancing the Right to Capital and Income
Balancing Transferability
Clearly the mix of property regimes not
only affects the capital formation (economic
development) process, but also who gets the income
from the capital. While not a new call, economists
still do not put enough effort into understanding
distribution. Once we enter into research on
property regimes we clearly have to face the
distribution issues.
Private and cotnmon property would also
facilitate leasing/rental, e.g., lndian reservations in
Montana lease water to local ranchers, and thus a
sharing of income, Once water is assigned to
individuals in private and common property
regimes, it becomes essentially a capital asset to be
used as these individuals and appropriate
organizations see fit, For the portion of the water
retained under state property, the state might
consider leasing the water until public needs
increase, while earning income for public services.
Balancing the Right to Security
The property regime “... allows the
formation of expectations in dealings with
others....(Emel. p. 662)” and thus enhances both
security and predictability of outcomes. While
appropriation provides the greatest security of the
three institutions, it is this very security that may
not lead to investment in new water saving
Easy transfer is necessary for mutual gain,
but all transfers would have to be regulated and
reviewed to insure no damaged third parties (and,
thus, mutual gain for everyone). Colby (1990b)
argues that state water policy representing
community values (pertaining to return flows, area-
of-origin impacts, instream flows) have improved
market transfers in the west (also see Metzger).
Transaction costs could be high (Colby
1990& Lynne et al. 1991). Yet, market transaction
costs will IikeIy be less than the costs that will
occur under central government controlled allocation
process. In Fdct, it may simply be impossible for
government to find enough money ever to
accomplish the information gathering task faced in
central allocation (see Lynne 1988, esp. p. 100),
Balancing the DurationlTerm
Australians market one-year permits, while
westerners market perpetual permits. Florida
currently gives usually a seven-yem permit. A mix
will likely be best in a market process with some
returning to the state each year (Kiker and Lynne
1979). State, common and private owners could
hold a variety of durations in their investment
portfolios. Shorter duration permits would cost less,
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short entrepreneurs with new ideas: the state might
also give a few of these away each year as well, to
encourage innovation.
Balancing the Prohibition of Harmful Use
The problem in water law is to define
which acts to allow and which acts to prohibit
(Singer, pp. 1021-1023) and to define what requires
compensation and what does not, i.e., to define
tolerable interference. The evolution of
reasonableness under the riparian doctrine has been
characterized as “enlarging the range of
noncompensable injuries” (Horwitz, p. 259) to
facilitate economic development, The challenge in
institution building is to find ways to reduce the
possibility of all external effects, third party and
otherwise, by redefining the content of (our
tolerable interference idea) danwwn absque injuria
(see Singer, p. 1026) which means “damage without
legal wrong”. This is riparianism at its allocative
best (Abrams, p. 1396): “imposing legal constraints
on individual riparian owners only when their self-
interested actions threaten the larger community’s
beneficial use of a common pool resource.” Under
administrative law and regulatory systems, use is
defined for specific standards of interference, e.g.,
a five-foot aquifer potentiometric draw down at a
neighboring well.
The area-of-origin problem has been
especially troublesome in the western U.S. from
transfers of water out of farming to urban areas
(Howe et al. 1990; McDonnell and Howe; Tarlock
1991), The city of Mesa, Arizona, e.g., makes cash
pdyments to Pinal County to offset the property tax
losses due to water being taken out of the private
sector (Colby Saliba et al, 1987),
Downstream user protection will be an
issue. Water quality issues could arise in transfers,
although private property regimes will require that
water be defined in quality terms as well as quality.
The tolerable interference for all these cases will
have to be worked out in the various decision
forums functioning both behind and with the
market.
Balancing the Liability to Execution and to
Residuary Character
When ownership rights lapse due to
abandonment or death, there must be ruIes
established for disposing the property. Under both
prior appropriation and riparian law, the water right
is handled similarly to land. With administrative
law, permits revert to the state. This may be
another opportunity for giving access to new
entrepreneurs.
Conclusions
Water markets can play a role in
“constructive institutional reform” (Swaney) for the
good of a community. Such markets should be
administered. Trelease (1965, p, 37) has noted the
need for thinking in terms of “regulated laissez
faire” with respect to water markets. Even if
regulated, markets will give another means for
southeastern residents to express their values.
Markets also do not have to carry the entire valuing
burden. Markets should be inserted among the
other decision forums.
In considering the general question of
moving toward privatizing and water marketing, we
were reminded of Trelease’s comment that (1961, p.
1152) water law will be changed in that direction “if
and when the people are convinced --- perhaps by
economists --- that things [water transfers,
efficiency] blocked by law are in fact desirable...,”
This puts a responsibility on us as economists to
make our value presumptions explicit as we work to
convince. Also, it appears we may have already
moved beyond the question of “if” to “when.”
Anderson and LeaI have suggested that water
markets are inevitable throughout the U.S, because
of the conservation-conservative coalitions that will
push for them. Economists will be important in that
transition.
Alas, lest we become too smug, DuMars
and Tarlock (1989) (cited in Gardner 1990, p. 1208)
have noted “While a society fashioned solely by
economists might be very efficient, it is unlikely
that one would choose to live there.” We believe
they are correct if economists stick with the strict78 Lyme and ,Saaritwa, Melding Private and Public interests in Water Rights Marke~s
version of the “I” view. It seems we may be able discussion focused on helping the evolution of
to overcome this criticism with socioeconomic balanced “I&We” water institutions.
rather than strictty economic research, analysis and
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Endnotes
1.The distinction is possibly more often phrased as the balance between market and regulatory approaches,
or the tension between market forces and broader social values. We choose here to deal with more
fundamental, and more easily definable, concepts.
2. This proposal is based on research in an ever more convincing literature. As Etzioni (1988, pp. 8-9)
reasons: “,..if individuals were actually without community they would have very few of the attributes
commonly associated with the notion of an individual person...such isolated individuals have little in
common with the level-headed maximizers assumed by the Whigish neoclassical paradigm. The I’s need
a We to be.” This is the socioeconomic, in contrast to the neoclassical economic, view of human behavior.
We prefer the former.J. Agr. and Applied Ecot~,, July, 1993 83
3, Interestingly, they use “I” view criteria, and then conclude the “I” view based market process is the most
appropriate of all possible processes, which is at best circular reasoning. This methodology is applied often
in the water literature, suggesting its ideological nature.
4. We appreciate David Mulkey’s comment it caused us to state our views more strongly and clearly.
5. Which seems to us inconsistent in that the act of “removing impediments” in itself is also intentional?
What are we missing here?
6. The riparian doctrine meets this criterion of adaptability well, but the transfer of water rights is not
voluntary and may be compensated on]y if the court deems the damage beyond tolerable interference.
7. In fact, markets will not even clear for very small amounts of water essential for life because the
marginal values are essentially infinite. Markets do not work well for essential needs. The discussion about
water markets should be shifted to discussing allocation among the marginal uses.
8. This position is not without controversy, Some believe the use of conserving technology is an ethical
issue, so why should users benefit from being wasteful? The usual ban on sale of conserved water in the
west (except in Oregon) reflects this view.